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Centralto all the departures from the standard theory is
the fact that the market has failed to develop an asset
that serves as a satisfactory hedge against inflation. Com-
mon stocks were once thought the prime asset to provide this hedge,
but they have been inadequate over the past decade. This failure
affects not only direct investments in corporate equity but also the
kind of secondary instruments developed by financial intermediaries
for indirect investment. Real property, aside from one family homes,
has not been a practical substitute for most investors.
The notion, popular in the 1950s and 1960s, that corporate
equity is a good hedge against changes in the general price level has
been severely battered. Since the mid-1960s, equity prices have been
subject to sharp declines in dollar value several times, and, though
dollar prices have subsequently recovered each time, the real value
of equities has fallen substantially. At the same time, the persistence
and magnitude of inflation since the mid-1960s, though unusual
for the United States, has led the public to believe that it is not a
passing phenomenon. Expectations of inflation and of the continu-
ing instability of the economy under inflation undoubtedly lie be-
hind the decline in stock market values.
Several different types of equity-linked financial instruments
reached a peak of importance in the late ].960s and then lost appeal.
Convertible bond issues were greatest in value, at around $4 billion
a year, and as a proportion of total corporate offerings, over 15 per-
cent, in 1967_1969.1 The proportion of new commercial mortgage
commitments by large life insurance companies that included income
or equity features rose in each year from 1965 to 1969-1970,
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reachingover 50 percent, but declined sharply to perhaps 10 percent FINANCIAL BE
by early 1973.2 Private placements of debt issues that included
equity kickers increased substantially in 1968 and 1969 and then re- Business Firn
ceded, falling by 1972 to almost the pre-1968 proportion of the total The popular
volume.3 Clearly the appeal and growth of these instruments re- presumed lags i
flected in part a concern over the uncertainty of the rate of inflation gate demand is
and a belief that equity values would keep up with whatever inflation to increase the
rate might occur. The subsequent decline of their appeal after 1969 do not rise im
reflected, perhaps, a belief that the variability of inflation would Costs are thou1
diminish, but also, probably more important, a general disillusion- output prices g
ment with equity as a hedge against inflation, inflation is ant'
The uncertainty and the lack of a practical hedge against inflation neutralaspri
have led investors to depart considerably from the behavior of the The sequenc
standard theory and from simple modifications of that theory that be just the opp
incorporate hedging. In the framework of the standard theory, an set to cover SI
accelerationof inflation such as began in 1965 would be unantici- generally after
patedat first, producing capital losses for creditors and capital gains expansion of o
for debtors; then anticipations would gradually catch up with devel- tion as an incri
opments and bring a corresponding increase in nominal interest rates, rise, because th
Nominal interest rates have in fact risen appreciably, perhaps suf- ity and
ficiently to compensate for the rate of inflation generally anticipated. output spreads
(The success of the standard theory in predicting this development is creases in some
important and should not be underrated.) Given a full adjustment of raises wages. Ti
nominal interest rates to inflation, the standard theory predicts that production pip
no major shifts in saving patterns should occur. Given uncertainty as in 1973,
over the inflation rate, however, shifts for hedging purposes from catch up later.
fixed-dollar to real assets should occur. Yet such shifts have been duction, but u
slight, and others have gone in the "wrong" direction toward fixed- pressed.
dollar liquid assets. The uncertainty of inflation has not produced When multip
the consequences that the standard theory, as modified for hedging, escalating, gove
implies should occur. initially curtail
This theory is not wrong given the conditions it assumes to pre- deteriorate fur
vail. But it neglects important characteristics of inflationary move- decline in outp
ments and their consequences. The following sections review finan- creases. Since
cial developments since the mid-1960s which are at least partly the aggregate dema
consequences of inflation, although other factors may also have been third of these
at work. We take up the consequences for business firms first, be- occurred in 19
cause developments in the trend of earnings under inflation affect demand
stock values. That has consequences for household saving and port- increases conti
folios, which are crucial in turn to the fortunes of financial inter- layed catch up
mediaries. After government borrowing is briefly reviewed, a final tion. Yet becai
section sums up the consequences for interest rates of the responses the rise in stan










































FINANCIAL BEHAVIOR OF SECTORS
Business Firms
Thepopular belief that inflation benefits businesses is based on
presumed lags in the transmission of inflation: An increase in aggre-
gate demand is thought to raise prices of final goods and services and
to increase the derived demand for inputs. If input prices and wages
do not rise immediately, profit margins in the meantime expand.
Costs are thought to rise to a position of equilibrium in relation to
output prices gradually. Thereafter, to the extent that the course of
inflation is anticipated, the effect on business profits is supposedly
neutralasprices and costs rise proportionately in equilibrium.
The sequence for most manufacturing firms, however, appears to
be just the opposite. As many studies have found, prices appear to be
set to cover standard unit costs of production and are increased
generally aftercostsrise.4 An increase in demand first leads to an
expansion of output, which is fed back to earlier stages of produc-
tion as an increase in demand for input factors. Profits may at first
rise, because the expansion of output absorbs available excess capac-
ity and reduces costs of production per unit. As the expansion in
output spreads through the economy, however, it elicits price in-
creases in some products, particularly basic materials, and eventually
raises wages. The price and wage increases travel forward through the
production pipeline and raise costs. If materials prices rise rapidly,
as in 1973, they may raise output prices faster than wages, which
catch up later. The .rising costs push up prices at each stage of pro-
duction, but in the process, profit margins are on the average de-
pressed.
When multiplying price increases make it evident that inflation is
escalating, government policies are instituted to curb inflation. These
initially curtail demand across the economy. Profit margins now
deteriorate further and more drastically, because of the resulting
decline in output, long before they benefit from a slowing of cost in-
creases. Since 1965, monetary policy has contributed to a slowing of
aggregate demand in 1967, 1970, and 1974—1975. In the second and
third of these episodes, business recessions occurred, and one almost
occurred in 1967. Although the slack markets removed the upward
demand pressure on prices, inflation decelerated slowly because cost
increases continued working through the economy, reflecting a de-
layed catch up to earlier pressures and anticipations of further infla-
tion. Yet because of slack markets, price increases could not match
the rise in standard unit costs, and profit margins, even for standard
levels of output, were squeezed. In certain industries, profit margins14The Financial Effects of Inflation
were depressed further by government regulation of prices, which
delayed the adjustment to cost increases. Regulation increased under
the inflationary conditions of the early 1970s, as, for example, in
the imposition of comprehensive controls in 1971 and the later
tightening of controls on oil and gas prices. As a result of lower
profit margins and reduced output, total real profits fell.
An escalation of inflationary pressures, therefore, brings in suc-
cession two contractionary influences to bear on profits. First, while
under stable prices profits normally rise until near the end of a
business expansion, a surge of inflation appears first in materials
prices and other costs of resources and holds down the nominal
increase in profits and reduces profits in real terms. Second, sub-
sequent policiesto subdue inflation contract business activity,
further depressing profits. Only in the early stages of a business
expansion, when inflationisrelatively moderate and output is
recovering, do profits rise strongly in real terms. One indication of
these influences is the higher profit rate in 1965, during a non-
inflationary cyclical expansion, than in 1968-1969 or 1972-1974,
when rapid inflation accompanied the expansions (see Figure 2-1,
series 1, page 26).
The foregoing discussion has been in terms of profits as conven-
tionally measured. However, inflation alters the valuation of business
assets and produces capital gains or losses, most of which conventional
accounting disregards. To incorporate this effect of inflation, we
must digress to adjust the profits data. Four adjustments may be
made, three of which affect profits measured in current prices as well
as in constant prices, and one of which is designed to express profits
in dollars of constant purchasing power. Those that affect profits in
current dollars are the corrections for (1) increases in the replace-
ment cost of capital assets and inventories; (2) capital gains on
tangible assets; and (3) changes in the market price of outstanding
debt. The other is (4) the correction of dollar amounts to take
account of general price inflation.
1. Increases in the replacement cost of capital assets and inven-
tories. Historical cost accounting tends to misstate operating profits
from an economic standpoint because allowances for the deprecia-
tion of capital and the cost of materials reflect acquisitions at earlier
dollar prices which no longer prevail for new acquisitions. Last in-
first out accounting (LIFO) largely corrects this understatement of
the cost of materials used, but most corporations still use the mis-
leading first in-first out method (FIFO). On this account, historical
cost accounting in an inflation overstates profits and increases in-
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Inthe recent revisions of the national income data by the Depart-
ment of Commerce, capital consumption was adjusted to put it on
a current price basis, thus taking account of the effects of infla-
tion and relative price changes on the value of the depreciable capital
stock. In addition, this capital consumption adjustment removed the
effects of accelerated depreciation on business accounts, as the
earlier introduction of the inventory valuation adjustment removed
the effect of price changes on the cost of materials.
2. Capital gains on tangible assets. If the replacement cost or price
of capital goods rises or falls by more than the general price level,
there is a need not only for adjusting depreciation, noted in (1),
but also for entering a capital gain or loss. The firm has the use of
a capital good or land that is worth more or less than was paid for it;
the new price represents the current resource cost of using the
capital. To recognize the change in price, the value of the capital
good should be written up or down to produce a nonrecurring capital
gain or loss which should be reflected in the profits and net worth of
the firm, even if segregated as an extraordinary adjustment. Current
practice is to record these changes in value only when the asset is
sold. A full accounting for the effects of price changes requires the
recognition of such changes in the period in which they occur,
whether or not a purchase or sale takes place.5
3. Changes in the market price of outstanding financial assets and
liabilities. The rise or decline of interest rates, as a result of inflation
or other causes, will alter the current dollar value of a firm's out-
standing financial assets and liabilities. For example, a rise in the
anticipated rate of inflation, which causes interest rates to rise, re-
duces the dollar value of a firm's outstanding debt. Changes in the
market value of outstanding securities, like those in prices of capital
goods, affect the current net worth of a going firm and generate
capital gains or losses to the firm.
It might be objected that the gain or loss to the firm of a change in
market value of debt due to changes in interest rates cannot be real-
ized unless the debt is retired and refunded at the new interest rate.
For, if the debt is serviced until maturity, the ultimate dollar value at
redemption is not affected by changes in market interest rates during
its lifetime. That is a mistaken view, however. The capital gain is
there, whether realized by refunding or not. A firm has gained by
having issued its securities before a rise in interest rates occurs.
Having contracted the loan at the previous low rate, the firm is worth
more than a firm that is alike in other respects but has issued debt at
the new higher rate. (This gain in the market value of borrowed
funds is equivalent to that noted above for resources whose market16 The Financial Effects of Inflation
value has increased.) Year by year, as the bond approaches maturity,
the benefit to the firm of having borrowed earlier at a lower interest
rate appears in profits as a lower interest cost than the firm would
otherwise have to pay. If this benefit is recorded as a one-time
capital gain in the dollar price of the bond at the time the price fell,
subsequent yearly increases in the dollar price as it rises to its par re-
demption value are recorded as capital losses. These subsequent
capital losses cancel the year-by-year contribution to profits of the
lower-than-market interest cost paid by the corporation. After these
adjustments, profits are increased initially by the capital gain when
interest rates rise and are not affected thereafter; there occurs no
double counting of the contribution to profits of lower interest rates.
Changes in market interest rates are reversible, of course, and the
rates usually fluctuate more than do prices of capital goods. An
adjustment for each movement could impart large fluctuations to
net worth over time. In practice, such fluctuations could be avoided
by assigning reversible changes in net worth to a special fund, from
which transfers to regular net worth were made gradually over time.
4. General price inflation.Inflation reduces the real value of
financial assets and liabilities and thus produces gains and losses
that are traditionally disregarded in measuring profits. Most corpora-
tions, particularly nonfinancial corporations, have more financial
liabilities than financial assets and thus, in inflation, gain in real
terms from the depreciation in the purchasing power of their net
financial liabilities. Recognition of this depreciation requires adding
the decline in real value of financial liabilities to profits and de-
ducting the decline in real value of financial assets, which, like the
depreciation of tangible assets, is a cost to the firm.
It is sometimes objected that, unless a decline in the real value of
debt is realized by a sale or redemption, it should not be added to
current profits. The addition may be necessary, however, to correct
an understatement that occurs even without a sale. Insofar as infla-
tion comes to be anticipated, nominal interest rates rise to compen-
sate lenders for the depreciation in real value of loans. While the
higher interest paid by a firm on this borrowing is a deduction from
its profits, the offsetting depreciation in the real value of this debt
due to inflation is usually ignored. This is illogical. Part of business
borrowing can be viewed as a replacement to the flow of internal
funds for the payment of additional nominal interest, which com-
pensates for the depreciation, due to inflation, of outstanding debt.
The replacement leaves profits and net worth unchanged in real
terms, though such debt depreciation does not show up in the con-
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rise to compensate fully for the inflation rate, the firm has a net
benefit, which adds to profits, from the decline in real value of its
debt.)
The same is true for assets, producing the opposite effects on
profits; higher interest rates on financial assets compensate for de-
preciation in real value due to inflation. In the case of two financial
assets, however, inflationlosses cannot be recouped by higher
nominal interest because no interest is explicitly paid. These assets
are cash and accounts receivable, to the extent that higher interest
is not implicitly recouped through a change in terms. Inflation in
effect makes the holding and use of these assets more expensive in
real terms, as if a tax had been levied on them. Holdings of the items
taxed by inflation can be pared, but only so far. The cost to the firm
is a continuing requirement to add to the dollar amount of these
financial assets to maintain them at the same real level; the cost is
either paid out of profits or passed on to customers through higher
prices. As Lintner [1975] points out, if the cost is not covered by
higher real prices, it reduces gross internal funds available for other
purposes and raises borrowing requirements.
All the foregoing are adjustments to the current value of profits.
However, current dollar amounts, even after adjustment, give a mis-
leading impression of changes over time because of declines in the
purchasing power of a dollar. To facilitate comparisons between
years, we should translate the current values described above into
real, or constant price, values by deflating by a general price index.
We use the consumer price index, although some other general price
index, such as the GNP deflator, would do as well and perhaps apply
even better to business firms.
We summarize these adjustments in Table 2-1 by the experience
of a hypothetical corporation. This example is based on the follow-
ing assumptions: (1) the nominal amounts of cash, other financial
assets, gross capital assets, and debt remain constant; (2) the price of
capital goods rises 20 percent, while the general inflation rate is
10 percent; (3) there is a rise in the level of interest rates which
decreases the market value of financial assets and debt. In the bal-
ance sheet, the first two columns show beginning and end-of-period
values under conventional accounting practices, column (3) incor-
porates adjustments to current values, and column (4) is the adjusted
current-value balance sheet deflated to account for the assumed 10
percent general rate of inflation. In the income statement, the first
column reflects conventional accounting practice, the second in-
corporates adjustments in current prices, and in the third all the
figures are deflated to take account of the general price level increase.Table 2-1.Examples of Inflation Adjustments.
A. HypotheticalBalance Sheet
Current Dollars Constant Dollars
ConventionalMarket (market value in
Practice Valuebeginning-of-
period prices)
Beginning End ofEnd of
of period periodperiodEnd of perioda
.





Otherfinancial 1,000 1,000 900 810
Fixed capital, gross
d10,00010,00012000C 10,800
Accumulated depreciation —2,000—3,000 —3,240
Net fixed capital 8,000 7,0008,400 7,560
TOTAL 9,1008,100 9,400 8,460
Liabilities
Debt 2,000 2,000 1,800b 1,620
Net Worth 7,100 6,100 7,600 6,840
B. Hypothetical Income Statement
(beginning to end of period above)
Current Dollars At Beginning-
ConventionalAdjusted of-Period
(1) (2) (3)
Sales minus direct costs
and taxesd 2,000 2,000
Depreciation —1,000 —1,200 —1,080
Net Profit 1,000 800 820
Gain from rise in price of net
f capital goods
— 560
Loss from decline in market b value of financial assets — 100 —90
Gain from decline in market b valueof debt — 200 180
Loss from decline in beginning-
of-period real value of cash
and other financial assets — — 110
Gain from decline in beginning-
of-period real value of debt 200
Net Profit,including capital
gains and losses 2,300 1,560
aAssuming 10 percent increase in general price level during period.
bReduction in value from rise in interest rates.
c Increasein value of gross fixed capital and depreciation from 20 percent
rise in cost of capital goods (in Part B, $8,400-$7,000 =$1,400).
dDepreciation at 10 percentper year.
eAverage prices during year assumed to reflect half the full-year change in the
general price level.
1'Value of net capital at end of period in current dollars deflated to beginning
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While the real value of sales is 5 percent lower than the nominal
value, real depreciation is larger because of the higher value placed on
capital assets (20 percent in nominal terms, 10 percent in real terms).
Profits (excluding capital gains and losses) are therefore 18 percent
lower in real terms. However, capital gains add substantially to real
profits. The market value of net fixed capital is $1,400 higher in
nominal terms and $560 in real terms. Although the beginning of
period real values of cash and financial assets are reduced by 10
percent ($110) in real terms as a result of the general inflation, and
an additional $100 in nominal terms and $90 in real terms because
interest ratesrose, the real value of financial liabilities is lower by
$380, partly as a result of the general inflation and partly from the
rise in interest rates. As a result of all of these adjustments, real
profits are calculated at $1,560 at beginning-of-period prices, in
contrast to $1,000 by a conventional accounting.
This example covers most of the main adjustments produced by
inflation, though it does not show likely changes in flows—such as
increases in dollar revenues and costs—and in interest expenses when
net debt is incurred at higher interest rates. Moreover, the effect of
inflation on flows of funds can be quite different from that on in-
come, because many of the adjustments to income do not directly
and concurrently reflect changes in flows but affect assets and
liabilities in real terms and show up only in future flows of funds.
While the effects on profits of general inflation are widely ac-
knowledged as needing recognition,6 those due to changes in relative
prices of capital goods and in the dollar price of debt outstanding are
controversial. The SEC has recently required large corporations
under its jurisdiction to report on current replacement cost. The
adjustment for changes in dollar price of debt has been estimated
in a recent article7 but has yet to receive wide endorsement.
What isthe effect of these various adjustments on corporate
profits? Table 2-2 gives annual estimates in 1964 dollars for the past
two decades. Corporate profits after taxes in column (1) are based on
the standard accounting treatment of depreciation and inventory
costs. Column (4) shows profits adjusted to a national accounts
basis—that is, eliminating the effects of inventory valuation changes,
a correction that reduces profits in almost every year, and calculating
capital consumption on a consistent current cost basis. The latter
correction tends to reduce profits by removing the understatement
of capital consumption results from calculating the value of
capital at historical cost, but it tends to increase profits by removing
the effects of the liberalization of depreciation rules.
The estimates of profits in column (10) add to column (4) the
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.22 The Financial Effects of Inflation
pricelevel, which added to profits in all years because the debts of accounting viei
nonfinancial corporations exceeded their financial assets. Column under different
(11) adds in addition all real capital gains and losses resulting from wide fluctuatio:
price changes. These include the revaluation of land and reproducible rnterest rates of
tangible assets (to the extent that their price changes differed from the latest profit
those of the CPI), which added to profits in most years. of a continuing
The controversial adjustment for changes in the market value of sumption. A pr
outstanding debt (item 3, above, and sixth line in Table 2-1, Part B) a conservative o
is made in column (12). This is the most volatile element of profit but not future
adjustment, swinging from large positive to large negative values with constant rate 0:
changesin interest rates, changes in spe
Table 2-3 shows the net worth of nonfinancial corporations under projection of c
different valuation methods. The first (A) is essentially the standard lationships
accounting valuation with financial assets and liabilities at face value Our insistenc
and tangible assets at historical cost. The second (B) includes current losses to the m
valuations for tangible assets, but face values for others; and the third dorsement of p
(C) is as close as we can come to a completely market valuation basis. include all such
Long-term debt is at market value, and tangible assets are at current Complete curre
cost. The short-term financial assets can be thought of as being at market values o
market value, assumed to be identical to face value, individual comi
The different concepts of profits and net worth give rise to several It may be mon
measures of the rate of return on net worth, shown in columns 4 torical costs foi
through 8. The first is essentially a conventional accounting measure. index of capit
The second uses the adjustments incorporated in the National pnce index, anc
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) in the numerator (excluding capital goods fi
inventory revaluations from profits and applying consistent deprecia- simplicity, yet
tion rates on current values of plant and equipment) and comes- ment of aggrega
pondingly measures inventories and plant and equipment at current of current cost
cost in the denominator. The third takes account of the erosion crudely, for pr
through inflation of real value of financial assets and liabilities expected in co
denominated in dollar terms. The fourth adds to the numerator SEC requireme
capital gains and losses on tangible capital from changes in the real accounting.9
prices of inventories and of land, plant, and equipment. The fifth Turning now
adds the effect of interest rate changes on the market value of long- Slid Figure 2-1,
term debt to the numerator and correspondingly values long-term tionally reporte
debt at market in the denominator. Columns (9) through (11) show adjustments hay
the market value of equity per unit of net worth, under the three as is to be expi
alternative definitions of the latter. A brief survey of similar series 2—3 is substanti
recently presented in the literature is given in the Appendix. capital cost in
Although column (8), incorporating all the adjustments, is more lower througho
appropriate for assessing the total return to stockholders in any 1968 (Table 2-
single year, each of the other columns is useful for distinguishing the in rates of retu
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accounting views, or the level of profitability one might project
under different assumptions about inflation rates. For example, the
wide fluctuations of column (8) presumably reflect the effects on
interest rates of rises and declines in the rate of inflation. To project
the latest profit rate under this concept would imply an expectation
of a continuing rise or decline in the inflation rate, an unlikely as-
sumption. A projection of the profit rate of column (5) is in a sense
a conservative one, since it incorporates the effects of past inflation
but not future inflation. A projection of column (6) incorporates a
constant rate of general price level changes, but not any future real
changes in specific land or plant and equipment prices, while a
projection of column (7) would assume a continuation of past re-
lationships between these prices and the general price level.
Our insistence on the theoretical relevance of capital gains and
losses to the measure of profits should not be construed as an en-
dorsement of proposals that individual corporations be required to
include all such adjustments in their reports of profits to the public.
Complete current cost accounting would require estimates of the
market values of individual capital goods, virtually impossible for an
individual company to measure in view of changes in technology.
It may be more practical for individual corporations to adjust his-
torical costs for changes in some prescribed general index of prices,
index of capital goods prices, or industry-specific capital goods
price index, and to ignore any deviations of the prices of individual
capital goods from the general indexes. This has the advantage of
simplicity, yet allows for the major effects of inflation. The adjust-
ment of aggregate data as in Table 2-2 does not escape the problems
of current cost accounting, but it can be done adequately, even if
crudely, for present purposes by ignoring the need for
expected in company accounts. As noted earlier, however, recent
SEC requirements point in the direction of requiring current cost
accounting.9
Turning now to our estimated adjustments, we show, in Table 2-3
and Figure 2-1, the rate of return on corporate equity as conven-
tionally reported and with the various adjustments for inflation. The
adjustments have sizable effects on the levels of the rates of return,
as is to be expected. The conventional rate in column (4) of Table
2-3 is substantially reduced when we shift to the NIPA concept of
capital cost in column (5). The NIPA adjustment makes the rate
lower throughout because it makes profits lower, except in 1962—
1968 (Table 2-2), and net worth substantially higher. The decline
in rates of return due to higher replacement costs is roughly offset,
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Rate of Change of Consumer Price Index
I I J I I I
'55 '57 '59 '61 '63'65'67'69'71 '73 '75 '77
Source:Table2—3 and Bureau of Labor Statistics, consumer'price index, all items (year to
year).
Note:Identification of profit rates in Table 2—3.
1:Conventional accounting method (col. 4).
2:Rate with Tangible assets adjusted for replacement coat (col. 5).
3:Rate 2 pluschangein real value of net financial liabilities (coi 6).
4:Rate 3 pluscapitalgains or losses on tangible capital (coL 7).
5:Rate 4 pIuscapitalgains or losses in market value of debt (cal. 8).
Figure2-1Ratio of After-Tax Profits to Net Worth,withVarious Adjustments





all items (year to
L 5).
ol. 6).
rm debt (coi 8).
iousAdjustments
What We Have Learned Since the Mid- 1960s 27
inthe real value of net financial liabilities [column (6)]. These give
a rate in 1975—1977 that is close to or above its level in 1959—1960
preceding the steep rise of the early 1960s. The adjustments for both
tangible capital and financial gains and losses added in column (8)
then raise the profit rate on the average, particularly in the period
since the mid-1960s when real capital values and interest rates rose.
These adjustments, particularly the latter, exhibit great variability
in direction as well as magnitude from year to year and produce wide
swings in rates of return. The corresponding rates for individual
companies would, of course, show considerable diversity.
The rate of return, however measured, is highly dependent upon
cycles in business activity. It is high in the vicinity of cyclical peaks
and low near cyclical troughs. Its movements also give evidence of
an adverse effect of inflation on operating profits. The rate of return
was generally low in the late 1950s, after a decade of mild but per-
sistent inflation. It then rose steadily during the price stability of the
first half of the 1960s and fell in the inflationary second half of that
decade. All the measures display the usual cyclical recovery follow-
ing the 1970 recession. The 1973-1975 recession produced dif-
ferences, however. The sharp rise in inflation in 1973-1974 improved
the profit rate by conventional accounting but reduced it by the
NIPA concept. It improved it moderately by the adjustments in
column (6) and greatly by those in columns (7) and (8). While the
sizeof the inflation adjustments then moderated, interest rate
changes reduced the fully adjusted rate in column (8) dramatically
in 1975-1976. As compared with 1972, the conventionally measured
rate was quite high in 1976-1977, the NIPA rate was quite low, and
the column (6) rate, incorporating the effects of general price level
changes, was about the same. The fully adjusted rate on average
was low in 1975-1976, but jumped above the 1972 level in 1977;
the column (7) rate, which does not include the interest rate ad-
justments, was also higher in 1977 than in 1972.'°
In general, therefore, the inflationary environment since the mid-
1960s has reduced the real profit rate, however measured, from the
high level reached during the price stability of the early 1960s.
Since the end of the decline in 1970, the adjusted rates have on
the average recovered moderately. At the same time, they have
fluctuated considerably. Changes in the rate of inflation greatly
affect all the measures of the profit rate, but not always in the same
direction nor by the same amount. This adds to the uncertainty
over the effect of inflation on profit rates.
The ratio of stock prices to net worth declined to a low level
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Column 9:Conventional accounting method.
Column 10:Tangible assets at current cost.
Column 11:Tangible assets at current cost and long-term debt at market value.
Figure2—2.Market Value of Equity per Dollar of Net Worth, 1954-1977
28
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performanceof stocks as a hedge against inflation. This decline
reflected a broad reassessment by the market of the value of net
worth. An associated decline also occurred in the price-earnings
ratio—the market's valuation of current after-tax earnings." For
example, based on profits corrected for general price level changes
(column 6) and net worth with debt at face value (column 10), the
price-earnings ratio declined from 16 in 1955-1964 and 18 in 1972
to 7.5 in 1975 and recovered only to 9-10 in 1976-1977. Some
decline in stock prices was likely after the mid-1960s because of the
fall in profit rates; all measures of the profit rate declined from the
mid-1960s to 1970. After 1970, the profit rate recovered to an
extent that varies with the particular adjustments made for the
effects of inflation. It is not clear to what extent market participants
allowed for the various effects of inflation on corporate profits. If
stock prices are interpreted as a reflection of earnings, the market
seems to come closest to accepting the rate of return of column (6),
including only general price level adjustments, in the sense that the
price-earnings ratio on this basis fluctuates the least. Nevertheless,
it does show a large reduction between 1955—1964 and 1975-1977.
If stock prices are interpreted as a reflection of net worth, all the
concepts show about the same range of valuations and all show low
levels for recent years.
The sharp further decline in stock prices after 1972 suggests that
the market saw these effects as generally reducing real profits. In
any event, the decline in the price-earnings ratio after 1972 can be
attributed to widely held expectations not only that profit rates
were lower and would not rise much, but also that they would be
subject to large fluctuations and were vulnerable to sharp setbacks
whenever the rate of inflation stepped up. A low price-earnings
ratio may well persist, therefore, because of the extreme uncertainty
of profits in an inflationary environment.
These developments in profits and equity values had a largely
predictable influence on corporate finances, as can be seen in
Table 2-4, which shows the sources and uses of funds in real terms.
Since 1964 marks the end of a period of relative price stability,
averagesare given for the decades 1955-1964 and 1965—1974;
and for the recent years, 1975-1977. Gross internal funds of cor-
porations (undistributed after-tax profits, less inventory gains, plus
capital consumption in current prices) were high in 1965 compared
with the preceding decade, but they did not grow substantially in the
next decade, although they did then increase in 1975-1977. How-
ever, the replacement cost of capital and acquisitions of financial












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)32 The Financial Effects of Inflation
lack of growth in net investment and increasing reliance on external
funds. Equity financing expanded, but, given the decline in real
share prices after 1968, this avenue was limited. Most of the increase
in funds in the 1965-1974 decade, compared with the preceding one,
was borrowed. This made corporations even more subject to the tur-
bulence of an inflationary economy. During each round of monetary
restraint to subdue inflation, financial markets tightened and became
unreceptive to new bond issues,forcing many companies (and
municipalities) at such times into an illiquid reliance on short-term
debt requiring regular rollovers, followed by a period of massive re-
financing into long-term debt as soon as conditions permitted. The
cumulative disruption of these developments to normal business
financing contributed, along with lower real profit rates and general
uncertainty, to the impairment of corporate liquidity. The trend of
declining liquidity ratios was reversed and some improvement ac-
complished only in the last few years.'2
As a result of heavy borrowing, the debt-equity ratio as conven-
tionally measured rose. This is demonstrated by the calculations of
Part B of Table 2-4. By the conventional measure of column (5),
additions to debt exceeded those to equity by 40 percent in the
earlier decade but by well over 100 percent since then. If we include
in equity additions from revaluations of capital assets, the difference
between 1955-1964 and the succeeding decade is eliminated (column
6). If we also take account of the effect on debt of the decline in
real value of net financial liabilities, the trend is reversed; the ratio of
debt to equity financing declines. It turns out that much of the
corporate borrowing was a replacement of depreciated debt and did
not add to the debt-equity ratio.
To the extent that the decline in stock prices in recent years
reflected a correction of the overvaluation of the mid-1960s, stocks
might be expected to keep up with inflation in the long run. After
the previous major inflation—World War Il—stocks generally re-
covered their initial real value, but only over the long run. A study of
twenty-four countries'3 for the period from the beginning of World
War II to the end of the 1960s shows that while stocks did not
maintain their purchasing power during the World War II inflation,
they regained their prewar level of purchasing power eventually in a
majority of the countries. Table 2-5, reproduced from the study,
shows that rates of change in stock prices in real terms for the full
period were positive for fourteen of the twenty-four countries.
Stock prices kept up with inflation wherever the average inflation
rate was no more than 4 percent. Where they did not keep up was
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Stock ConsumerStock Stock Values
Country Period ValuesPrices Values (percent)
Australia 1939-69 5.0 4.4 0.6 20
Austria 1937-69 9.5 7.4 2.0 92
Belgium 1939—69 4.8 5.8 —1.0 —25
Canada 1939-69 6.2 3.2 3.0 144
Denmark 1939-69 3.6 4.6 —1.0 —26
Finland 1939-69 9.9 10.5 —0.6 —16
France 1939-6913.5 12.9 0.7 22
India 1939-69 1.4 6.2 4.7 —76
Ireland 1939-69 5.4 4.5 0.9 29
Italy 1939-6914.2 14.9 —0.7 —20
Japan 1936-6910.5 18.9 —8.4 94
Mexico 1939-69 7.1 7.5 —0.4 —12
Netherlands 1939-69 6.8 4.9 1.9 79
New Zealand 1939-69 4.9 3.7 1.3 46
Norway 1939-69 2.6 4.3 —1.6 —38
Peru 1939-69 0.8 10.3 —9.5 94
Portugal 1939-69 4.4 4.1 0.4 12
South Africa 1939-69 6.8 3.5 3.4 175
Spain 1940-69 4.3 7.4 3.1 59
Sweden 1939-69 6.2 4.0 2.2 94
Switzerland 1939-69 4.4 3.0 1.5 55
United Kingdom1939-69 5.9 4.3 1.6 61
United States1939-69 7.1 3.2 3.9 224
Venezuela 1939—69 4.5 3.4 1.1 41
Source: International Monetary Fund, Financial Statistics, with some earlier
data from United Nations, Statistical Yearbook and individual country reports.
Reproduced from Cagan [1974a].
aContinuous compounding.
of 9 percent, as compared to 6.5 percent for all countries. Recovery
to the prewar value of stocks occurred for the median country by
the mid-1950s (not shown), a deéade and a half after the beginning
of the World War II inflation. If we apply the same period of re-
covery to recent experience, U.S. stock prices have not yet had time
to catch up with the resurgence of inflation since the mid-1960s.
An important characteristic of the early post-World War II period,
however, not so far repeated in the post-1965 inflation, was an
appreciable moderation of the inflation rate after the initial wartime
episode.
The post—World War II experience suggests that, except for short-
run fluctuations, stocks can maintain their real value over the very34 The Financial Effects of In flat/on
long run.'4 The past decade may be unusual because of the high
valuation of equity per dollar of net worth attained in the mid-
1960s. The onset of rapid inflation reduced the real rate of return
and showed stocks to be vulnerable to increases in the rate of infla-
tion. Given this uncertainty, the market value of equity earnings is
likely to remain low. Even if the valuation remains low, however, a
stable valuation would allow stocks to provide their historical role
of a hedge against inflation, though at perhaps a lower than historical
rate of return if inflation produces a less hospitable climate for
business profits. Of course, whether stocks will in fact provide a
hedge in the long run remains to be seen. If they do, they would
meet the long-run purposes of pension funds and retirement savings.
But the short-run instability of stocks makes their long-run reliability
as a hedge against inflation uncertain until experience clarifies their
long-run behavior in an inflationary environment.
Households
Theunattractiveness of common stocks helps to explain house-
hold behavior which conflicts with the standard theory of the effects
of inflation. For most households, saving is not easily rechanneled,
but some response to changes in expected rates of return is likely to
occur given sufficient time. From the onset of inflation in 1965
through 1972, household portfolios of financial assets at first did not
change radically (Table 2-6). There was a slight rise in the share of
equity holdings until 1968, reflecting the increase in stock prices
rather than any net investment in equities by households. House-
holds were purchasing investment fund shares while they were dis-
investing in other equities at an even greater rate. After 1968 the
share of equities dropped, especially after 1972, when the decline
in stock prices, combined with continued net sales of equities by
households, reduced equities from 39 to 22 percent of household
financial assets. Deposits largely took the place of equities as an
element of household assets.'5
From a broader view of the household portfolio, which includes
tangible assets such as land, owner-occupied housing, and consumer
durables, it appears that a further shift took place after 1972—a
reduction in the share of financial assets as a group and an increase
in the share of tangible assets, from 37 to 47 percent (Table 2_7).16
This suggests that households shifted from financial assets to real
property and durable goods, as a theory of hedging against inflation
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Table 2-6.Distribution of Financial Assets of Households,a 1955-1977.
(percent)
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195510040.5 16.6 8.7 7.9 24.3 32.2 18.7
195610040.5 16.4 8.8 7.6 24.3 319 18.8
195710036.1 17.4 9.5 7.9 26.2 34.1 20.4
195810042.5 14.8 8.5 6.3 23.9 30.2 18.8
195910042.5 14.9 8.8 6.1 23.7 29.8 18.8
196010040.7 15.2 9.5 5.8 24.5 30.3 19.6
196110044.9 13.7 8.6 5.1 22.8 28.0 18.6
196210040.1 14.3 9.0 5.3 25.7 31.0 19.9
196310042.1 13.4 8.5 5.0 25.1 30.1 19.3
196410042.4 12.9 8.3 4.6 25.4 30.0 19.3
196510043.4 12.0 7.5 4.6 25.5 30.1 19.1
196610039.5 13.3 8.3 4.9 27.0 31.9 20.3
196710043.2 11.6 7.4 4.2 25.9 30.1 19.3
196810045.4 10.9 6.7 4.1 25.1 29.2 18.6
196910040.6 12.9 8.0 4.9 26.5 31.4 20.0
197010038.4 12.5 8.6 3.9 28.3 32.2 20.8
197110039.2 11.1 8.1 3M 28.9 31.9 .20.8
197210038.6 10.6 7.8 2.8 29.7 32.4 21.1
197310029.8 12.6 8.8 3.8 35.2 39.0 22.4
197410020.4 15.410.6 4.8 40.4 45.1 23.8
197510023.2 14.410.044 38.7 43.1 23.7
197610025.4 13.1 9.5 3.6 38.0 41.6 23.5
197710021.7 13.2 9.1 4.1 40.6 44.7 24.5
Source: Flow of FundsAccounts, 1946-1975 (December 1976) for 1955-1971;
1972—1977 data directly from Federal Reserve Board, tables on Financial
Assets and Liabilities: Households, Personal Trusts, and Nonprofit Organiza-
tions.
Note: Total is sum of columns in boldface.
ajocludes personal trusts and nonprofit organizations.
blncludesinvestment company shares.
cIncludes savings bonds, short-term marketable Treasury securities,open market
paper, and money market fund shares.
dlncludeslife insurance and pension fund reserves, security credit, and miscel-
laneous assets.36 The Financial Effects of inflation
Table2-7.Tangible andFinancialAssets of Households, 1955—1977.













19551,343.6 258.7 98.8162.3 823.8 61.3 38.7
19561,402.5 270.4 110.1169.0 853.0 60.8 39.2
19571,388.3 280.3 119.6174.0 814.3 58.7 41.3
19581,551.8 297.3 131.6175.1 947.8 61.1 38.9
19591,650.0 315.8 148.9179.2 1,005.8 61.0 39.0
19601,683.1 326.7 155.8181.8 1,018.9 60.5 39.5
19611,851.1 336.9 168.6183.6 1,162.0 62.8 37.2
19621,834.0 345.8 177.8188.1 1,122.2 61.2 38.8
19631,971.9 356.0 187.0194.3 1,234.6 62.6 37.4
19642,100.0 368.0 198.0203.5 1,330.5 63.4 36.6
19652,237.0 375.0 208.7215.6 1,437.7 64.3 35.7
19662,200.8 375.8 213.1227.8 1,384.1 62.9 37.1
19672,413.7 395.7 219.0240.8 1,558.2 64.6 35.4
19682,589.7431.0 220.7254.3 1,683.7 65.0 35.0
19692,476.7 444.5 227.7262.6 1,541.9 62.3 37.7
19702,446.3 442.1 226.4266.7 1,511.1 61.8 38.2
19712,602.1 455.7 233.4278.2 1,634.8 62.8 37.2
19722,787.6 492.1 252.0293.8 1,749.8 62.8 37.2
19732,605.8 522.3 267.5302.5 1,513.5 58.1 41.9
19742,362.8 524.8 268.8300.3 1,268.9 53.7 46.3
19752,496.3 538.3 278.1307.9 1,372.0 55.0 45.0
19762,694.2 579.8 296.9320.2 1,497.2 55.6 44.4
19772,709.7 621.7 318.3323.9 1,445.8 53.4 46.6
Sources: Financial assets from Flow of Funds Accounts, 1946-1975 (December
1976) for 1955-1971; 1972—1977 datadirectly from Federal Reserve Board,
tables on Financial Assets and Liabilities: HousehoLds, Personal Trusts, and
Nonprofit Organizations. Bureau of Economic Analysis for tangible assets except
land. Land is from Raymond Goldsmith's worksheets for the National Bureau's
project on The Measurement of Economic and Social Performance. Land values
were extrapolated for 1976—1977 by the value of owner.occupied housing.
Dollar figures deflated by year end CPI, all items.
alncludes financial assets of personal trusts and nonprofit organizations. ALL
except common stock are at face value.
wasdesired,but the fact that the increase arose from capital gains
in tangible assets, rather than from net purchases, casts doubt on the
interpretation of deliberate hedging. Table 2—8, which presents
ratios of household asset acquisition to personal disposable income,
shows that the increase in total asset acquisition between 1955—1964
and 1965-1974 was largely in financial assets, only a small part of
which was contractual saving through pension funds. Households
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Table 2-8.AssetAcquisition of Households as percent of Personal Djs.
posable Income, 1955-1977
Total


























































































































































































































































Note: Investment in tangible assets is net of depreciation. Persona! disposable
income is adjusted to include government insurance credits and capital gains
dividends. Tangible assets exclude investment by nonprofit organizations. Totals
may not equal sum of components because of rounding.
Source: Flow of FundsAccounts, 1946-1975 (December 1976), for 1955-1973;
Flow of Funds Accounts, 4th Quarter 1977 (February 1978), for 1974-1977,
table on Saving and Investment: Households, Personal Trusts, and Nonprofit
Organizations.
alncludes personal trusts and nonprofit organizations.
ated in 1965. In fact, they tended to reduce the share of income
devoted to acquisitions of housing and common stock, assets that
might have been expected to be the object of inflation-induced
saving. There was, however, some increase in investment in consumer
durables.
The savings ratios in Table 2-9 show that not only asset acquisitions38 The Financial Effects of In flat/on






NIA FOF Assets and Finan-
BasisBasisTangibleLiabilitiescia! Lia- Discrep-
(2)#(7)(3)#(4)Assets(5)+(6) Assetsbilitiesancy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1955 9.9 11.7 10.1 1.7 9.0 —7.3 —1.8
1956 10.1 12.0 8.1 3.8 9.4 —5.6 —1.9
1957 9.5 11.3 6.8 4.5 8.6 —4.1 —1.8
1958 8.3 10.0 5.0 5.0 9.2 —4.2 —1.7
1959 8.5 10.6 6.9 3.7 10.1 —6.5 —2.1
1960 7.5 9.4 6.1 3.3 8.6 —5.3 —1.9
1961 7.4 9.0 4.7 4.3 9.4 —5.1 —1.6
1962 8.0 9.8 5.6 4.3 9.9 —5.7 —1.8
1963 8.1 10.6 6.3 4.3 11.4 —7.1 —2.5
1964 10.0 12.0 6.5 5.4 12.1 —6.7 —2.0
1965 10.9 12.4 6.8 5.6 12.2 —6.6 —1.5
1966 11.2 13.2 6.4 6.8 11.4 —4.6 —2.0
1967 11.6 12.7 5.6 7.2 12.0 —4.8 —1.1
1968 11.5 12.6 6.4 6.2 12.2 —6.0 —1.1
1969 10.3 10.2 5.9 4.4 9.2 0.1
1970 10.9 11.8 4.3 7.5 11.0 —3.5 —0.9
1971 12.0 13.3 5.8 7.5 13.5 —6.0 —1.3
1972 11.5 13.7 7.3 6.4 15.0 —8.6 —2.2
1973 13.1 14.5 7.4 7.2 14.9 —7.7 —1.4
1974 11.1 12.7 5.0 7.6 12.5 —4.9 —1.6
1975 10.6 12.9 4.0 8.9 13.6 —4.7 —2.3
1976 10.5 12.3 6.2 6.1 14.0 —8.0 —1.8
1977 10.1 11.4 7.1 4.3 14.5—10.2 —1.3
Averages
1955—19648.7 10.6 6.6 4.0 9.7 —5.8 —1.9
1965-197411.4 14.1 6.1 6.6 12.4 —5.8 —1.3
1975-197710.4 12.2 5.8 6.4 14.0 —7.6 —1.8
Source: Flow of Funds Accounts, 1946-1975 (December1976) for 1955-1973;
Flow of Funds Accounts, 4th Quarter 1977 (February 1978) for 1974—1977,
tables on Saving and Investment: Households, Personal Trusts, and Nonprofit
Organizations.Savings on NIA basis are adjusted to Flow of Funds Accounts
concepts by adding credits from government insurance, capital gains dividends,
and net durables in consumption.
but also total saving rates, calculated from either Flow of Funds or
National Income and Product Accounts, were at a high level in the
decade after 1965. There was no move toward more rapid acquisition
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ersonal Disposable
were attempting to speculate on a high rate of inflation. Thus, house-
holds were not clearly avoiding financial assets or seeking financial
liabilities as a result of the acceleration of inflation.
The shift of household wealth from financial assets to housing
reflects the fact that residential property values have continued to
climb faster than general prices (Table 2—10) and that financial
assets have depreciated in real terms (even though we do not calcu-
late the additional depreciation from the rise in interest rates). It
could be that there was a shift in household demand to housing
assets but that it had the result mainly of raising their prices, since
Table2-10. Indicators of Single-Family Home Prices, 1963-1977. (1966=100)
—7.3 —1.8
—1.9
Nominal (Dollar) Prices Deflated Prices












Price Sales Sales Price Sales Sales
Index0 Price Price Indexa Price Price
1963 93.4 84.1 99.0 89.1
1964 94.3 88.3 98.7 92.4
1965 96.5 93.5 99.5 96.4
1966 100.0 100.0 100.0 lOOM 1000 100.0
1967 103.5 106.1 104.6 100.7 103.2 101.8
1968 108.8 115.4 113.8 101.6 107.8 106.3
1969 117.6 119.6 1197 104.2 106.0 106i.
1970 121.5 109.3 1243 101.6 9L4 1040
1971 1275 117.8 135.5 102.3 94.5 108.7
1972 135.6 129.0 147.4 105.3 100.2 114.5
1973 149.9 151.9 160.5 109.6 111.0 1173
1974 163.7 167.8 177.9 107.8 1105 117.2
1975 180.4 183.6 194.8 108.9 1108 117.6
1976 198.1 206.5 212.2 113.0 117.8 121.1
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Source: New single-family homes—Price index: U.S. Bureau of the Census,
Construction Reports: C27-77-Q1, June 1977, for 1963—1976. 1977 figure
extrapolated from first three quarters, C27-77-03, December 1977.
New single-family homes—Average prices: US. Bureau of the Census, Con-
struction Reports: C25-75-12, March 1976, for 1963—1972; C26-77-5, July
1977, for 1973—1976; C26-77-12, February 1978, for 1977.
Existingsingle-family homes—Medianprices:December sales,National
Association of Real Estate Boards, Annual Report 1975, 1976, 1977.
Deflation by CPI, annual average.
aprice index for single-family house identical toaverage house sold in 1967,
with respect to eight characteristics.
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thecurrent output of housing is small relative to the stock, and
there is no current output of land. The rise in prices may have
achieved a desired increase in the share of tangible assets in total
wealth. But did the demand for real assets increase, or did house-
holds simply benefit unexpectedly from the rising relative cost of
residential construction and relative scarcity of land with growth in
the population?
A possible indication of the attitudes of households is that the
value-to-debt ratio for owner-occupied housing did not increase by
the full amount of the rise in housing values due to inflation. House-
holds liquidated part of the capital gains on housing by borrowing on
existinghomes, oras shown by Table2-11, by borrowing
on new and existing homes in excess of the net investment in them,
particularlysince 1971. The ratio of market value to debt of
homes rose because the price increase outran the increase in debt,
but the rise in the ratio was small considering the size of the rise
in home prices. The borrowing is presumably due to a desire to "cash
in," facilitated by a high rate of turnover of existing homes. Such
borrowing is equivalent to selling part of the equity in residential
property and reducing the amount by which it serves as a hedge
against the uncertainty of inflation rates. But the borrowing would
not be undertaken to satisfy a desire to hedge, except to the extent
that the funds were used to invest in other real property or educa-
tion. To the contrary, borrowing is a speculation that future infla-
tion rates will be higher than the compensation for inflation built
into prevailing mortgage rates;its attractiveness may reflect the
fact that mortgaged houses are virtually the only medium for such
speculation available to most households. Although the escalation
of inflation in 1965 made real property more attractive as an invest-
ment, it did not therefore materially affect the net acquisition rate,
in part because most households need to borrow to buy property
and because borrowing costs at least partly reflected expected rates
of inflation.
Households have clearly not tried to use corporate equity as a
hedge against inflation in recent years. They have accumulated real
property as a hedge, but largely by passively accepting the rise in
its price and in its consequent share of household assets rather than
by acquiring new real estate assets. Overall, total saving has increased
via financial assets, as Table 2-9 showed.
How is an increase in household saving largely in the form of
fixed-dollar assets to be explained during a period of rising infla-
tion? One answer is that households wanted to restore financial
assets unexpectedly depreciated by inflation. In real terms total
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Through Owner-Occupied Housing, 1955-
Net Capital
Net Borrowing Gains
Investment on Home Net Saving in
in Housing Mortgages in Housing Housing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1955 18.7 13.6 5.1 14.6
1956 17.7 12.8 4.9 8.7
1957 14.7 9.9 4.8 8.6
1958 13.4 10.5 2.9 15.8
1959 16.4 13.2 3.2 15.0
1960 14.8 12.1 2.7 5.0
1961 13.0 13.1 —0.1 10.1
1962 12.9 14.3 —1.4 7.7
1963 13.8 16.6 —2.8 9.1
1964 13.6 17.2 —3.6 11.2
1965 13.3 16.8 —3.5 7.2
1966 11.5 12.8 —1.3 4.6
1967 11.1 12.5 —1.4 22.7
1968 12.4 15.0 —2.6 36.1
1969 11.7 15.4 —3.7 23.4
1970 9.9 11.8 —1.9 4.6
1971 14.5 20.8 —6.3 13.6
1972 19.2 30.8 —11.6 39.0
1973 19.5 32.8 —13.3 54.7
1974 14.5 22.3 —7.8 26.9
1975 11.9 21.9 —10.0 25.9
1976 17.9 33.4 —15.5 36.5
1977 24.8 44.5 —19.7 41.1
Averages
1955-1964 14.9 13.3 1.6 10.6
1965—1974 13.8 19.1 —5.3 23.3
1975—1977 18.2 33.3 —15.1 34.5
Sources:
Column (1): Residential construction, including mobile homes, less capital
consumption on housing. Flow of Funds Accounts, 1946-1975 (December
1976) for 1955-1973; Flow of Funds Accounts, 4th Quarter 1977 (February
1978) for 1974-1977, table on Saving and Investment: Households, Personal
Trusts, and Nonprofit Organizations.
Column (2): Flow of Funds Accounts, same as column (1).
Column (3): Column (1) minus column (2).
Column (4): For structures, the difference between changes in current cost
and changes in historical cost, in 1964 dollars. For land, calculated as in Table
2—2, column (7).
Dollar figures deflated: all flows by annual average CPI; capital stock by end-
of-year CPI. -
after1968, and by 1974 and 1975, they were below the level of the
late 1960s. Since many econometric studies of saving find that
wealth and saving are inversely related, other things being equal,
the decline in wealth helps to explain the increase in saving rates in
the period after 1968.
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Howlarge could the inflation-induced wealth effect on saving be? deposits, even t
Studies of personal saving or consumption suggest that the wealth instruments (re]
effect is on the order of 5 percent or less of changes in wealth.'7 rate). An attract
To put this in perspective, the net financial wealth of households attached to ma
was about two-and-a-half times personal disposable income in 1965. mterest rates
A rise in the inflation rate would reduce real wealth by the full assets the loss in
amount of the higher rate of price increase only if the higher rate other short-terr
were unanticipated and if it were not accompanied by offsetting hedge against in
adjustments in interest rates and equity prices. An unanticipated protection.
rise in prices of 4 percent, say, assuming no offsetting adjustments, At fffst sight,
would reduce real wealth by the same percentage and increase saving paymg deposits
at most by (0.04 X 0.05 X 2.5) 0.5 percent of income. resurgence mea
The inability to meet the uncertainty of inflation through satis- m rates of retui
factory hedges may itself have also contributed to increased saving, events of sevei
A study by Taylor [1974118 finds that total as well as financial rnflows into mi
saving varies positively with the inflation rate, when. the effect of iii 1966, 1969,
wealth is held constant. A plausible interpretation of this result is 10
that higher inflation increases uncertainty about the fuure value of
assets and real income and that households save more, as they
typically do, in response to an uncertain income stream. The fact
that households increased financial saving, primarily through the
8
acquisition of fixed-dollar liquid assets, is consistent with a desire
to increase liquidity in the face of uncertainty. This desire helps to
7-
explainthe anomaly during inflation, so far as the standard theory
of its effects is concerned, of household additions to holdings of the 6
very assets that are subject to depreciation in purchasing power by
inflation. 5 -
Tayloralso analyzed a cross-section sample of households to see
whether they hedged against the uncertainty of inflation by ac- 4 -
quiringreal estate. One of his variables identified respondents who
were so uncertain about the rate of inflation that they would not 3 -
offera prediction. This variable had a negative effect on household
purchases of real property and common stocks, except for a positive 2 -
effecton the real property purchases of high-wealth households.
These estimates do not have high reliability, but they are roughly 1-
consistentwith other indications that inflation has not led to greater
household purchases of real assets and equity. o
Interest rates rose rapidly beginning in 1965, and rates on fixed-
196465 66
dollar assets eventually compensated for a good part of the actual
Source:Prune com rate of inflation and, perhaps, for all of the anticipated rate. Once Economic AduiserE
this rise had occurred, households had no incentive to avoid fixed- United States League
dollar assets unless they sought a hedge against inflation rates that
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deposits, even though at times they paid far less than did market
instruments (represented in Figure 2-3 by the commercial paper
rate). An attraction of deposits, was that they were safe from the risk
attached to market securities of a decline in nominal value should
interest rates rise further, though deposits shared with all financial
assets the loss in real value from inflation itself. Thus deposits, as well as
other short-term assets, were presumably acquired as a form of a
hedge against interest rate uncertainty despite their lack of inflation
protection.
At first sight, it might seem that continuing strong flows into low-
paying deposits and other fixed-dollar assets at a time of inflationary
resurgence meant that households were not sensitive to differences
in rates of return. This presumption, however, is contradicted by the
events of several recent periods. There were sharp reductions of
inflows into mutual savings banks and savings and loan associations








1964'65 '66 '67 '68 '69 '70'7 1'72'73 747576' 77
Source:Prime commercial paper, four to six months, Annual Report of the Council of
Economic Advisers; average rate paid on savings deposits of savings and loan associations,
United States League of Savings Associations, Savings and Loan Fact Book.
Figure 2—3.Interest rates on Savings Deposits and Commercial Paper, 1964—7744 The Financial Effects of Inflation
openmarket rates shot well a'bove the ceiling rates on deposits
of those institutions. There was a rise in loans on life insurance
policies in the late 1960s when they offered contractual loans
at a 5 percent rate, well below other alternatives. Both demon-
strated the public's responsiveness to interest rate differentials (see
Table 2-12). Also, econometric studies of portfolio decisions have
long found interest rates to begnan9 In addition to port-
folio allocations, some recent research by Boskin [19781 indicates
that aggregate saving increases with a rise in interest rates, despite
the inability of earlier studies to find such a relation.
As an alternative explanation of the deposit flows, it might be
thought that households did not anticipate inflation. The study
by Taylor [1974] cited earlier contains an analysis of a cross-section
of households which bears on this question. He found that the
typical expected rates of inflation among the households in the
samples were quite close to actual rates. Moreover, if failure to
anticipate inflation were important, households that did anticipate
it and those that did not would reveal differences in saving behavior.
Based on the financial condition of a sample of households in 1959
and in 1967 and their expectations of inflation, Taylor found no
systematic relation between reported expectations of inflation and
the acquisition of various kinds of assets. This was true of households
standardized for income, wealth, and demographic characteristics.
These data pertain to the period before 1968 when the market
value of common stocks had been rising and appeared to be keeping
up with inflation, and households might therefore have considered
them an appropriate source of protection. Taylor's findings suggest
that the absence of major portfolio adjustments does not reflect
failure to anticipate inflation.
It would not be valid to conclude that the reason household
portfolios did not change was that anticipated inflation had no
effect on household behavior. For, in that event, we should have
no explanation for the substantial rise in interest rates since 1965.
The explanation therefore seems to be that the rise in nominal
interest rates was sufficient to forestall major shifts in household
portfolios. The rise in interest rates produced unanticipated capital
losses on bonds, but thereafter yields were sufficient to compensate
for anticipated inflation, and households maintained their fixed-
dollar holdings. Since households generally do not invest heavily in
market instruments, they continued to acquire depository assets,
except in certain periods when the differentials became unusually
wide. The importance of the uncertainty of inflation in producing a de-
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Additional evidence has been provided by Wachtel [1977] 20
ina time series study which estimates the separate influences on
saving of interest rates and households' uncertainty about future
inflation rates. The measure of inflation uncertainty, which differs
from Taylor's, is the average variance of inflationary expectations
across households. Wachtel's results confirm the indications of other
studies that uncertainty increases saving, suggesting that this effect is
probably the main explanation for the observed rise in saving when
inflation accelerates. In analyzing the components of saving, he
found that the main channel of the uncertainty effect on saving is
through a reduction in consumer credit, suggesting that households
prepare for an uncertain future by avoiding financial commitments.
In contrast to the standard theory, therefore, in which an accelera-
tion of inflation leads to an initial shift from financial saving to
equity and real property and to increased indebtedness, and to
some degree to a permanent shift for purposes of hedging, the
recent behavior of households under inflation differed materially.
Households saved a larger fraction of income and channeled little of
it into equities, with almost all financial saving going into fixed-
dollar assets. Part of this represented a restoration of the share of
wealth held in fixed-dollar form, which was most eroded by infla-
tion. But that is hardly the full explanation. From all indications,
this behavior also reflected a desire for greater liquidity in the face
of uncertainty over how high inflation rates might go.
It is conceivable that, after a period of adjustment, if the volatility
of inflation moderates and anticipations of the rate of inflation prove
reasonably accurate, common stocks may keep pace with the rate of
inflation over the long run and provide a hedge against moderate de-
partures from the anticipated average rate. In this situation, also,
saving would presumably settle down to a normal level. If the current
inflation does not accelerate further in the next few years, we shall
have a test of saving behavior under conditions of stable inflation.
In any event, it is hard to see the current situation continuing.
Real rates of interest on deposits, at current inflation rates, are
around zero or negative. But we have no insight as to whether the
next development will be an abatement of inflation or a further rise
in interest rates.
While the effects of inflation on the household sector as a whole
are of primary importance for financial institutions and markets,
differences among households in the impact of inflation are of con-
cern for questions of equity and burden. We expect such differences
partly because households differ in the composition of their assets
and liabilities, though there are also many other factors, such as
changes in
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changesin current income and living costs, that determine the effect
of inflation on individual households.
Two 'elements enter the calculation of effects on household
balance sheets. One is the composition of the balance sheet: the type
of assets held and the degree to which they are leveraged by debt.
The second is the behavior of various assets' prices during inflation.
In a study of the 1950s, a period of mild inflation compared with
recent experience, Goldsmith and Lipsey calculated leverage ratios
and asset price changes for various groups of households2' and found
that leverage ratios did not differ widely by wealth, income, or
occupation, but did show a consistent pattern by age, generally
declining with age of head from the peak level in the twenty.five to
thirty-four age group. The main differences were for consumer
capital assets (housing and consumer durable equipment), where the
oldest families had ratios perhaps half that of the peak group. Only
in the twenty-five to thirty-four age group was the leverage ratio
above one. We may interpret these ratios as indicating that, if all
age groups held the same price-sensitive assets, only the twenty-
five to thirty-four age group would enjoy a gain in net worth that
exceeded the gain in asset prices. The older the families, the more
their real net worth would be reduced by inflation. The main reason
for the differences was that the twenty-five to thirty-four age group
was most likely to have both price-sensitive assets (a home) and a
large debt (a mortgage).
The change in price for price-sensitive assets differed among
wealth groups in the 1950s, with higher wealth being associated with
larger price gains, except for the highest wealth group (gross estates
of $10 million and over). The reason was that the proportion of com-
mon stock in price-sensitive assets was positively related to wealth
and that stock prices outdistanced other prices during these years.
The top wealth group, however, did not have such large stock-
holdings, probably because they substituted tax-exempt bonds for
common stocks.
The characteristic of families that strongly distinguished between
those likely to gain from inflation and those likely to lose was their
homeownership status. Homeowners with mortgages, as a group, had
a leverage ratio of 1.15, homeowners without mortgages a ratio of
0.78, and renters a ratio of 0.58. The implication of these ratios is
that a rise in price of price-sensitive assets equal to the rate of infla-
tion would have produced a 15 percent increase in real net worth for
homeowners with mortgages, while renters would have suffered a
loss of 42 percent in real net worth. The rankings of the three
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±The Financial Effects of Inflation
and occupation groups. The highest leverage ratios, around 1.5,
were those of young families owning mortgaged homes; and the
ratio fell sharply with age, presumably reflecting lower mortgage-
to-value ratios among older homeowners who had been paying off
their mortgages for some time.
The effect of inflation on net worth for any group reflects also
the rate of increase in asset prices. The range of asiet price changes
was not very large from 1949 to 1958 among income or wealth
classes in the two homeowner groups, but among renters there were
high price increases among those with the highest incomes, the
oldest age group (sixty-five and over), and the retired. The reason
was that these groups had high proportions of common stock among
their price-sensitive assets during a period of large gains in stock
prices.
If we combine the leverage ratios and the asset prices, we can
estimate the changes in real net worth that would have occurred in
the absence of saving or trading of assets. Half of the groups of
renters would have had declines in real net worth betwen 1949 and
1958, despite the rise in stock prices; most groups of homeowners
without mortgages, small positive changes; and most groups of
owners of mortgaged homes, gains of over 10 percent.
No similar analysis has been performed for the period since 1965,
but the main relationships must have been the same, except for the
absence of the stock price rise that aided wealthier, older, and retired
groups, particularly renters, in the 1950s. Therefore, the result of the
recent inflation must have been losses in real net worth for almost all
groups of renters; small gains for homeowners without mortgages
and those with small mortgages, since house prices again outpaced
the general price level; and substantial gains for heavily mortgaged
homeowners, mostly young families.
For the household sector as a whole, therefore, real property
values have withstood inflation, but financial assets, including equity,
have been eroded in real terms. Despite this outcome, households
have continued to invest heavily in fixed-dollar assets because of the
limitations of real property and the safety of deposits and short-
term assets.
Financia'Intermediaries
Thedevelopment once thought to be the main danger to financial
intermediaries from inflation—that households would shun fixed-
dollar assets and thus reduce the inflow of funds—has not materialized.
Nevertheless, intermediaries have suffered from the unprecedented
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and from efforts to halt inflation. The problem has been particularly
acute where legal or contractual limitations have prevented or slowed
the response of intermediaries to the rise in market rates of interest.
In the long run, after their interest rates have risen to compensate
for anticipated inflation, intermediaries are able to pay a rate on their
liabilities that maintains their competitive position in the financial
structure. But, in the short run, some intermediaries have encoun-
tered difficult problems in the changing inflationary environment.
Because their asset holdings are mostly long term, intermediaries
responding to competitive pressures to pay higher rates on their
liabilities are hampered by average rates of return on their port-
folios that rise more slowly than market interest rates. The transi-
tion is not short, since it requires a turnover of a large portion of the
loans and securities in their portfolios acquired earlier at lower
rates. Transitional pressures underlay most of the difficulties the
intermediaries underwent in recent periods of monetary restraint
when short-term market rates rose sharply and the intermediaries
faced massive reductions in the inflow of funds.
The buffetings taken by financial intermediaries are highlighted in
Table 2-13, which shows sharp declines in the amount and share of
total lending in 1966, 1969, and 1974—periods of sharply rising
interest rates, when investors bypassed the intermediaries to invest
directly in market securities. Public agencies also increased their lend-
ing in credit markets directly in 1974. In all three episodes, dis-
intermediation occurred—that is, a decline not only in the share of
intermediaries but also in the absolute amount of funds supplied by
them. Given the rate of inflation, the decreases in real terms were
even larger than those shown in current dollars.
Accompanying the abrupt shifts to and from direct financing were
substantial changes in the shares of the major institutions in the part
of total financing that was done through financial intermediaries
(Table 2-14). Between 1965 and 1977, the share of commercial
banks ranged from 23 to 57 percent, that of savings institutions from
17 to 43 percent, and that of insurance and pension funds from 12
to 36 percent. The commercial banks were sharply affected by the
money market tightness in 1966 and 1969. Within the insurance and
pension fund sector, there was some shift away from life insurance
companies, particularly in the early 1970s and, for the life com-
panies, a considerable substitution of pension reserves for life insur-
ance reserves as a source of funds. The comparatively slow growth
of the life insurance business, which offers long-term investments
fixed in monetary terms, is surely not unrelated to the inflationary
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Table 2-14.Shares of Institutions in Credit Market Funds Advanced by







1955 100 18.0 32.8 34.0 20.5 15.2
1956 100 24.8 33.4 38.1 23.5 3.6
1957 100 22.0 31.4 38.5 21.1 8.1
1958 100 45.5 27.3 27.8 15.3 —0.6
1959 100 16.7 36.1 34.1 17.3 13.1
1960 100 27.8 28.9 29.8 15.4 13.4
1961 100 39.7 31.0 26.0 13.8 3.2
1962 100 39.7 29.3 23.6 12.5 7.4
1963 100 34.8 35.1 23.1 12.9 7.0
1964 100 40.2 28.2 22.4 12.1 9.2
1965 100 46.3 23.2 21.8 12.3 8.6
1966 100 37.5 17.0 35.7 17.3 9.8
1967 100 56.6 23.6 20.4 11.7 —0.5
1968 100 51.2 20.4 18.3 9.7 10.0
1969 100 32.5 25.5 23.2 12.1 18.8
1970 100 45.3 22.6 22.3 9.1 9.7
1971 100 46.0 35.7 13.0 7.4 5.4
1972 100 47.2 31.6 11.9 6.5 9.2
1973 100 52.8 22.0 14.6 7.5 10.6
1974 100 51.1 21.3 23.8 10.2 3.7
1975 100 23.0 43.4 34.6 14.1 —0.9
1976 100 31.0 38.3 25.4 12.7 5.3
1977 100 32.9 35.6 25.2 11.1 6.4
Averages
1955-1964100 30.9 31.4 29.7 16.4 8.0
1965-1974100 46.6 24.3 20.5 10.4 8.5
1975—1977100 29.0 39.1 28.4 12.6 3.6
Source: Flow of Funds Accounts, 1946-1975 (December 1976) for 1955-
1973; Flow of Funds Accounts, 4th Quarter 1977 (February 1978) for 1974—
1977, tables on Credit Market Supply of Funds and Sector Statements of Saving
and Investment.
Most financial intermediaries have no special need to hedge against
the direct loss of their own purchasing power due to inflation, since
theirassets and liabilities are both denominated in fixed-dollar
terms. For some, however, the difference in maturity structure of
assets and liabilities—that is, the longer maturities of assets than of
liabilities—creates a need to hedge against sudden increases in market
yields which result from the acceleration of inflation. For all the
intermediaries, the successive increases in market interest rates after
the mid-1960s imposed real, if unrecognized, balance sheet losses and52 The Financial Effects of In flat/on
madethem understandably fearful of further increases in interest
rates. At such times of rising market yields, those that are saddled
with assets of long maturity acquired at earlier low yields and with
liabilities that are short term are subject to pressures to obtain the
highest possible returns on new loans. Since allfinancial inter-
mediaries naturally seek the best investment return they can reason-
ably obtain, changes in interest rates are relevant to all of them. The
life insurance companies, which are relatively protected by the long
maturity of their fixed-dollar commitments, aside from their obliga-
tion to make policy loans at fixed rates, are described (Lintner
[1976]; and Lintner, Piper, and Fortune [1978]) as varying the
rate of commitments for future loans partly according to expected
changes in interest rates. In effect, the commitment rate depends
upon expected future inflation rates, since these affect interest
rates.
Equity features on loans were believed in the 1960s to reduce the
danger of capital losses when inflation rates rose and pulled bond
yields higher than had been anticipated. In the second half of the
1960s, as noted earlier, the intermediaries experimented with equity-
type investments, in many cases on a much broader scale than had
been customary. Their flirtation with equity-type investments can
be viewed as a response to the uncertainty of accelerating inflation.
An attitude took hold that an overly conservative investment strat-
egy would miss opportunities for matching the performance of more
adventurous competitors.
This attitude encouraged equity kickers and income participations,
used in private placements mainly by life insurance companies.
These were provisions for warrants or convertibility into common
stock of corporate borrowers and, in loans to builders, a specified
participation in any income of the project above a base amount.22
Managers of many financial institutions became intensely conscious
of rates of return and, in the tight money environment of the late
1960s, equity features held out the prospect of larger returns than
could safely be extracted from borrowers by a high straight-interest
payment. The subsequent outcome, however, was disappointing.23
As prospects of bonanzas from equity faded and bond yields sta-
bilized at a high level, the institutions returned to their traditional
form of straight-interest lending.
Private pension funds are in different circumstances from those of
deposit and insurance institutions. Most corporate pension funds
have fixed-dollar obligations at distant future dates and discretion in
funding. They receive contractual contributions from participants,
who cannot easily withdraw. The corporate sponsors of these plans
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stand to gain from higher returns on assets. Nevertheless, as shown
in Table 2-15, while funds increased their concentration in equity
substantiallyuntil1972, the concentration declined after that
both because the market value of equity holdings fell and because
the proportion of new funds channeled into equity was reduced in
favor of government and corporate bonds. The shift into equities is
somewhat understated because the totals for credit market instru-
ments in Table 2-15 are in par values. If we estimate market values
of long-term assets as we did market values of long-term corporate
liabilities in Table 2-2, the share of equities would be about 65
percent in 1968-1970 and 75 percent at the peak in 1972. The
share of credit market instruments would be around 30 percent in
1968-1970 and 36 percent in 1974.
The changes in the composition of net purchases show the shifts
in direction even more strongly. The equity share rose from below
40 percent in the 1950s to over 100 percent, while the share of
credit market instruments fell from 60 percent or so, and there were
even net sales in 1971 and 1972. In three of the last four years,
however, credit market instruments were again more than half of
net acquisitions, even though equitiesstill accounted for more
than half of assets.
If equity had provided the hedge against inflation that the inter.
mediaries were looking for, the public might also have found equity
attractive and have channeled their savings into equity and not into
the intermediaries. Then the intermediaries would have found a
remedy to one problem only to face another. The disappointing per-
formance of equity, however, precluded such a rechanneling, even
assuming it would otherwise have occurred. Since they have weathered
the storm of rising market rates several times during periods of
tight money, there is growing confidence that intermediaries will
weather storms of similar magnitude in the future. Although a
renewed threat of increased inflation would resurrect the desire to
find hedges, the unsatisfactory results with equity in recent years
raise doubts thatfinancialinstitutions would experiment with
equity soon again in a replay of those conditions.
Government
Federaland local governments are major suppliers of securities
and so can influence conditions in financial markets, as was sug-
gested by the concern about "crowding out" of private borrowers in
1975. Inflation can affect government budgets and the supply of
government securities, though the standard theory is not concerned
with this sector and offers little guidance. Two propositions of the









1955 10033.2 63.1 3.7 32.0 60.5 7.5
1956 10033.562.2 4.3 34.5 57.1 8.4
1957 10032.063.8 4.2 37.360.0 2.7
1958 10039.657.0 3.5 44.5 54.4 1.1
1959 10042.654.0 3.4 47.648.4 4.0
1960 10043.453.0 3.6 49.1 45.7 5.2
1961 10049.547.3 3.2 57.3 40.3 2.4
1962 10046.4 50.1 3.5 52.6 42.9 4.6
1963 10050.3 46.5 3.2 51.046.9 2.1
1964 10052.443.6 3.9 40.5 45.1 14.4
1965 10055.3 40.8 3.9 57.7 36.1 6.2
1966 10052.1 43.3 4.6 50.440.2 9.4
1967 10057.2 38.1 4.7 69.519.6 10.8
1968 10060.6 34.9 4.5 74.1 20.5 5.4
1969 10060.035.4 4.6 84.9 13.0 2.1
1970 10060.6 35.0 4.4 64.0 34.1 2.0
1971 10067.9 28.4 3.7122.9—22.4 —0.5
1972 10073.5 23.3 3.2105.9 —8.2 2.3
1973 10067.0 29.3 3.8 62.2 36.1 1.7
1974 10054.341.2 4.5 21.1 77.6 1.2
1975 10059.5 36.8 3.7 45.0 53.1 1.9
1976 10062.5 34.2 3.3 57.5 40.9 1.6
1977 10055.7 40.1 4.2 24.964.9 10.2
Averages
1955-196410042.2 54.1 3.6 44.6 50.1 5.2
1965-197410060.835.0 4.2 73.4 24.7 4.1
1975-197710059.2 37.0 3.7 42.5 53.0 4.6
1946-1975 for 1955—
standard theory of unanticipated inflation suggest, however, that
government borrowing might decline under inflation. The real
value of interest payments on outstanding securities would decline,
and the progressive income tax would raise revenues in real terms.
Also, a rise in nominal interest might run up against statutory limita-
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Table 2—15.Financial Assets and Net
1955-1977. (percentage distribution)
Purchases of Private Pension Funds,
Source: Flow of Funds Accounts, (December 1976)
1975; Flow of Funds Accounts, 4th Quarter 1977 (February 1978) for 1976—
1977, Private Pension Funds: tables on Financial Assets and Liabilities, and
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Table 2-16 shows what has happened since 1965. Borrowing in
real terms by state and local governments remained on a moderately
rising trend except for a jump in 1971. Total real borrowing by the
government sector rosesubstantially, though with considerable
variation from year to year. The federal sector had large deficits,
particularly in the 1970s, and federally sponsored agencies raised
increasing amounts to finance their lending activitiesin various
years beginning with 1969. As a consequence, the government sector
increased its demands on financial markets and thus contributed to
a rise in real interest rates, though some of these funds were re-
turned as loans to nongovernmental sectors of the economy and thus
were rechanneled rather than withdrawn from financial markets.
To what extent government borrowing was a response, and to
what extent a contributor, to inflation is a complex question. No
doubt it was both. In any event, from 1965 to 1974 (to exclude the
unusually large 1975—1977 federal deficits), the increase in house-
hold financial saving of $79 billion (Table 2-12) was nearly half
absorbed by the increase of $34 billion in borrowing by the govern-
ment sector.
BEHAVIOROF INTEREST RATES
Themost dramatic effect of inflation in financial markets has been
the extraordinary rise in interest rates (Figure 2-4). From around
4½ percent in 1964-1965, high grade corporate bond yields reached
8 percent in 1970 and have remained between 7 and 9 percent in
the years since. High grade municipal bond yields rose from 3'/4
percent in 1964 and 1965 to 6½ percent in 1970, and 5-7 percent
since then. The Fisher effect implies such a rise. We can use these
changes in interest rates to form a rough impression of changes in
anticipated rates of inflation, assuming that there was no change in
the real rate of interest. If we use the rate on corporate bonds, we
would estimate that the anticipated rate of inflation over twenty
to thirty years rose by about 4 percentage points between 1964-
1965 (4½ percent) and 1975-1977 (8'/2percent).If we use the rate
on municipal bonds, we would estimate an increase of about 3 per-
centage points over ten to fifteen years, the usual life of municipal
bonds. The existence of taxes on income distorts the estimates
somewhat, presumably exaggerating the rise estimated from cor-
porate bond rates and diminishing that estimated from municipal
bond rates. Thus, if the early 1960s average inflation rate of 11/4
percent was also the anticipated rate at that time, expectations


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































58The Financial Effects of In flat/on
4to 5 percent or a little more, somewhat below actual rates at the there is little d:' time, which were 6 to 7 percent. fluènces may h Another question is raised by the rapidity with which interest demand for bo rates responded to the rise in the rate of inflation, since past behavior real internal f suggested a long lag, attributable to the slowness with which antici- resulting pations come abreast of current developments. In his study of the upon any antic earlier evidence, Sargent ([1973b1, [1976]) found that the adjust- borrowers; the] ment of interest rates to inflation had indeed been slow, but not interest. In add necessarily because anticipations changed slowly. He showed that if 1969 produced anticipations of future inflation are simply extrapolations of past rates up shari rates of inflation, as Fisher [1930] assumed, we should not expect alone could the inflation premium in interest rates to completely compensate interest rates in for the inflation rate in the short run. The reason for the failure Such develoi to offset completely is that inflation is accompanied by increases in rates in the 1
the money supply and decreases in the demand for money balances, need the Fish
Both of these produce short-run increases in the demand for various and in due
assets that offset to some extent the tendency of interest rates to However, antic
rise in response to inflation. The result of ignoring these counter- rently with
effects on interest rates was to make the positive direct effect of but may have
inflationary expectations appear to be slow and incomplete. Using the other dev€.
this theoretical analysis, Sargent was able to clarify the difficulties a rapid respons
past research had encountered in testing the direct effect of infla- tion (Figure 2-
tion on interest rates. He concluded that the unreasonably long lags it seems nec found for the effect of inflation on interest rates were due to this in explaining t
confounding of separate effects, cause the evid4
Yet it does not seem unlikely that before the 1930s or even World the supply side War II, long-term anticipations changed very little in response to cur- or the fraction rent U.S. inflation rates, which were in any case generally mild. Be- up the relative cause of the commitment to the gold standard, in which the long- shift into real run price level was tied to growth of the gold stock, prices would household inte not be expected to stray far from a mild trend. Under those con- values after 19 ditions, a sudden rapid rise in prices would be viewed as requiring increasing a subsequent decline back to trend.25 Although the complete float- rise in interest i
ingof the dollar free of the gold tie did not occur until 1973, by the An unusual 1960s the public must have viewed prices as largely determined effect is afford by nongold influences. Anticipations may have responded much denly in Augi
more rapidly to an acceleration of inflation in the mid-1960s, there- changing the
fore, than in earlier episodes.26 freeze would t
Even considering the likely reduction in the lag between price or that it wol
developments and price anticipations, the rise in interest rates when farm products
inflation accelerated in 1965 was extraordinarily rapid. As shown in three months
Figure 2-4, bond yields rose year by year almost as fast as the was in fact vi
inflation rate did. While the total rise in yields was a little smaller, for the three iWhat We Have Learned Since the Mid- 1960s 59
thereis little discernible lag in the movements up to 1969. Other in-
fluènces may have contributed to the coincident response. Business
demand for borrowed funds rose because inflation initially reduced
real internal funds for the various reasons discussed earlier. The
resulting increase in the demand for external funds did not depend
upon any anticipation of continuing inflation on the part of business
borrowers; therefore, it exerted an upward pull on the real rate of
interest. In addition, the restraint of monetary policies in 1966 and
1969 produced periods of financial tightness which also ran interest
rates up sharply, even though temporarily. These developments
alone could have accounted for much of the initial sharp rise in
interest rates in the second half of the 1960s.
Such developments do not explain the continuing high levels of
rates in the 1970s, however. To explain these high levels, we do
need the Fisher effect. Anticipations of higher inflation formed
and in due course maintained nominal rates at higher levels.27
However, anticipations of inflation may not have formed concur-
rently with the onset of inflation in the second half of the 1960s,
but may have been buttressed in their effect on interest rates by
the other developments mentioned to produce the appearance of
a rapid response of interest rates to each step-up in the rate of infla-
tion (Figure 2-4).
It seems necessary to emphasize the increase in demand for funds
in explaining the initial rise in interest rates in the mid-1960s, be-
cause the evidence discussed earlier fails to show any reduction on
the supply side. Households did not reduce saving relative to income
or the fraction channeled into fixed-dollar assets. Apart from bidding
up the relative prices of residential property, households made little
shift into real assets. Any possibility of a constant or increasing
household interest in equity was dashed by the collapse of equity
values after 1968. Given that households continued to allocate an
increasing flow of saving into fixed-dollar investments, the sharp
rise in interest rates must have come from the demand side.
An unusual glimpse into the inner market workings of the Fisher
effect is afforded by the three month freeze on prices imposed sud-
denly in August 1971. Here was an "experiment" in suddenly
changing the anticipated rate of inflation. Few doubted that the
freeze would be enforced, that it would last the full three months,
or that it would successfully arrest the rise in most prices (only
farm products and a few other items were exempt) for at least
three months even if prices caught up afterwards. The price level
was in fact virtually frozen, and the anticipated change in prices
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zero. Not much evasion through adulteration of the quality of goods
could occur quickly. The nominal rate on three month instruments
sold at the beginning of this period should therefore have fallen
to the real rate, whereas just previously the nominal rate presumably
incorporated an anticipated rate of inflation of 3 to 5 percent. What
happened to the nominal rate when the freeze was announced?
Instead of declining by the 3 to 5 percent, or 300-500 basis points,
implied by the Fisher effect, it was little changed, declining in the
week after announcement of the freeze by eight basis points for
ninety-day prime bankers' acceptances and by forty-five basis points
on new issues of three-month Treasury bills. (Over the subsequent
four weeks, Treasury billsfell a maximum of eighty-three basis
points, but this later decline cannot be attributed to the announce-
ment of a three month price freeze. It would reflect expectations
of developments after the period of the freeze.) Since short-term
interest rates were around 5 percent during this period, a decline
by the presumed rate of anticipated inflation of 3 to 5 percent
would have reduced them to 0-2 percent. (Long-term rates depend
upon long-run expectations and would not be expected to respond
much to the freeze, as they did not.) What kept nominal three month
rates from falling immediately and substantially upon the announce-
ment of the freeze?28
One answer appears to be that the supply of short-term funds is,
in any short period, virtually inelastic to changes in real interest
rates. The only shift in a short period that in practice could reduce
interest rates would involve money balances, but they are influenced
by nominal—not real—rates. The price freeze had very little im-
mediate effect on nominal rates, hence real rates rose; but house-
holds did not shift from variable-priced assets to bills and commercial
paper on such short notice for so short a period. On the demand
side, government and business were not in a position to reduce the
demand for borrowed funds, despite the rise in real rates of interest
during the freeze period. To be sure, if real rates rose and remained
higher over a long period, firms would reduce inventory and trade
credit financing, but clearly they would not make major adjustments
for only three months.
Since changes in anticipations change market interest rates by
shifting either supply or demand or both, the 1971 freeze indicates
that the responses in demand and supply take time. Given the short-
run inelasticity on the supply side, however, most of the adjustment
to anticipated inflation probably reflects the demand for funds, and
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It is certainly conceivable that, if a change in the anticipated rate
of inflation is not viewed as temporary and if anticipations form
rapidly, the response of interest rates could be rapid. This is the view
of the new theory of "rational" expectations which challenges the
older view that interest rates adjust to inflation gradually. The new
theory holds that all available information on future prospects is
used in forming anticipations of inflation. The implication is that
anticipated rates of inflation are not extrapolations of past move-
ments but are unbiased estimates of future developments. The errors
over time may of course be sizable; "unbiased" means only that the
errors tend to average zero. Extrapolations, by contrast, produce
estimates biased downward in a period of rising inflation rates.
Sargent ([1973a] and [1976]) showed that under rational expecta-
tions the negative effect on interest rates, mentioned earlier, would
not interfere with the Fisher effect. An empirical study by Fama
[1975] found that nominal interest rates since World War II exhibit
no trace of bias in relation to actual inflation rates, such as would
occur if anticipations were based on extrapolations of past inflation
rates.
The new theory of rational expectations without bias is appealing.
It implies not unreasonably (given the gains and losses at stake) that
the public makes use of all available information, including sophis-
ticated economic knowledge, to forecast market developments. It
merits and is receiving further empirical testing. As for speed of
response, however, it implies only that the public forms expectations
as rapidly as pertinent information can be digested. This could occur
slowly, since new developments are typically difficult to interpret
until with time their permanence is revealed. It is therefore not in-
consistent with the new theory of rational expectations to conclude
that interest rates rose rapidly in the second half of the 1960s be.
cause of the effects of inflation on business finances and monetary
policy and not because of a rapid adjustment of anticipations to the
emerging inflation, though perhaps they formed more rapidly than
ever before. That episode, therefore, cannot be taken as conclusive
evidence that anticipations will respond to inflationary developments
coincidentally or even very rapidly, though certainly they will sooner
or later. It seems clear that anticipations do not change with every
short-run swing in the inflation rate. The decline in inflation in 1975
and 1976 to 5-6 percent from the high rates of over 12 percent in
1973-1974 did not produce a comparable decline in long-term
bond yields (which would have been over 500 basis points) to indi-
cate a fall in anticipated rates of inflation. The obvious explanation is
that yields had not previously adjusted upward to the 1973-1974r
'I
62 The Financial Effects of Inflation
rates of inflation, because the public wasnotsure that the rate of
inflation of those two years would be maintained over the next
five to ten years. (It is true that short-term interest rates rose sharply
in 1973-1974, but here the effects of monetary stringency and of
higher anticipated inflation are difficult to disentangle.)
Yet there is no doubt that financial markets have become increas-
ingly sensitive to prospective changes in the rate of inflation, as the
public follows the latest data on prices, partly because of the con-
sequences for monetary policy and interest rates. The important new
development is that financial markets now expect interest rates to
be sensitive to inflation prospects. This expected sensitivity, com-
bined with the uncertainty about the rate of inflation, adds a new
element of risk to long-term commitments. While investors may view
current market yields as fully adjusted to current anticipations of in-
flation, there is risk of capital losses if the inflation rate subsequently
rises above the anticipated rate. Such risk may account for a higher
premium on long-term bond yields, as suggested by the puzzling and
otherwise unexplained wide differential between high grade bond
yields and short-term rates in 1971—1972 and 1975—1977 (see Figure
2—4.). To some extent, the differential could reflect anticipations of
a long-run inflation rate which exceeds that for the period immedi-
ately ahead, but that seems unlikely because such a difference be-
tween long-run and short-run anticipated inflation rates would not
prevail for so long a time.
The fear has often been expressed that financial institutions and
markets as they have developed in the United States cannot survive
in an inflationary environment. For the inflation rates so far ex-
perienced, this does not appear to be the case. To be sure, an impor-
tant reason for the continued growth of fixed-dollar assets, despite
their vulnerability to changes in inflation rates, is the absence of
practical alternatives. Otherwise, it is hard to see how ceiling interest
rates on savings deposits as low as 5½ to 6 percent can be maintained
when the rate of inflation by any measure in 1976 and 1977 was
around 6 percent or more and gives no indication of declining in
the near future. Indeed, itis hard to see how zero real rates of
interest can be maintained indefinitely. Interest rates will have to
rise if inflation rates remain at present levels or go higher. Financial
intermediaries will be under pressure to match such increases in
payments to depositors, and, to do so, they will need some relaxa-
tion of current regulatory restraints.
NOTES
1. Securities and Exchange Commission, Statistical Bulletin, various issues.
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3. "At their peak popularity in 1969, equity incentives (kickers) were in-
cluded in approximately 35 percent of the debt issues that were placed directly
with investors. This contrasts with a range of 0—10 percent during 1955—1967.
By year end 1972, however, use of incentives had declined to a level only
modestly above the average for the entire period 1955—1967, and it remained
at a low level during 1973 and 1974." Piper and Arnold [1977], p. 278.
4. This behavior of manufacturing prices is discussed, with references to the
literature, in Cagan [1974b].
5. A change in the real value of a capital good reflects either a change in
the anticipated stream of real returns (as when a land site becomes more pro-
ductive because of developments favorable to its location) or a change in the
real cost of production of capital equipment which in the long run will induce
a corresponding change in its marginal productivity, occurring through adjust-
ments in the amount used relative to other factors of production. (The change in
the stream of profits relative to the change in net worth will be consistent
with the going rate of return on capital. The capital gain or loss to be recorded
can be viewed as the discounted present value of the change in the stream of
real returns to the capital good. It is implicitly assumed in making this adjust.
ment of profits that depreciation schedules, in allowing for obsolescence, do not
anticipate future changes in real value over the life of capital goods.)
6. Fabricant [19761. See also Davidson, Stickney, and Weil [1976].
7. Shoven and Bulow [1976].
8. The larger part of the real capital gains recorded in column seven in
1968—1976 reflected increases in the real value of structures, owing mainly to
the relative rise in construction costs. It may take time for the marginal pro-
ductivity of these structures to increase commensurately through adjustments
in the amount used in each industry (see note 5), and in the meantime, the
increases in value may therefore overstate their contribution to the future stream
of profits.
j
The accuracy of the price data used for measuring the real value of capital
is frequently questioned. There is presumably some upward bias in the capital
goods price index and, therefore, overstatement of capital gains due to the
inadvertent inclusion of quality improvements in capital equipment as prices
increase. Whatever the amount of this bias, itis not likely to have increased
substantially over the period as a whole. Any overstatement of capital gains on
this account is therefore fairly constant relative to the value of plant and equip-
ment and would not be responsible for the wide swings in the value of this item.
That is particularly clear in view of the fact that the adjustments in column
seven were negative (indicating a decline in relative value) in the years of mild
inflation from 1957 to 1964.
9. See Fabricant [1978].
10. The rate of return to net worth, which is an important determinant of
the value of common stocks, is not appropriate for evaluating the return to cap-
ital. The latter is measured by the return to shareholders plus interest paid to
bondholders as a ratio to the replacement cost of tangible capital. Some es-
timates in the literature of this rate of return to capital are reported in the
Appendix. For this rate, the effect of inflation on the market value and real
value of debt outstanding transfers income between stockholders and bondholders64 The Financial Effects of Inflation
and washes out. Capital gains or losses on tangible assets are also generally ex-
cluded.
The return to capital before or after tax has declined since the mid-1960s
and in recent years was somewhat below its average level in the late 1950s.
Its long-run trend has been variously interpreted as constant with a cyclical
high point in 1965 and cyclical lows in the 1970s (Feldstein and Summers
[19761) or as upward until the mid-1960s and downward since then (Kopcke
[1978]). The rates of return to net worth adjusted for inflation in Table 2-2
and Figure 2-1 show a similar though smaller long-run rise to the mid-1960s and
decline thereafter. The rise and decline are smaller here mainly because the
rising prices of the late 1950s and post-1965 years imposed real losses on bond-
holders which were transferred to stockholders. Whether such transfers continue
in coming years depends upon the adjustment of interest rates to future rates
of inflation.
11. This can be calculated from Table 2-3 as the ratio of the market value of
equity per dollar of net worth at the end of the preceding year to current year
after-tax profitè per dollar of net worth at the end of the preceding year (Table
2-3, columns 4-8 divided by columns 9-11).
12. See "Recent Shifts in Corporate Financing Patterns," Federal Reserve
Bulletin, September 1976, pp. 733-42.
13. Cagan [1974a] -Empiricalstudies of the decline in U.S. stock prices since
the mid.1960s have appeared in increasing numbers. Nearly all of them focus
on the negative effect of inflation on stock yields in the short run. A recent
collection of these papers, with references to earlier studies, appears as "Session
on Inflation and Stock Prices," Journal of Finance, May 1976, pp. 447-87.
See also Fama and Schwert [1977].
14. See Lintner [19751, p. 275, for the theoretical reasons to expect this
outcome. Also see Malkiel [1977].
15. Long-term market instruments are recorded in Table 2—6 at par values
which do not reflect their decline in market price with the rise in market inter-
est rates. Correction to allow for that depreciation would reduce the percentage
share of this group in the years of rising yields. Since the percentage is low to
begin with, however, the correction would make little difference to the share
of deposits or equities. The largest corrections were from 8.0 to 5.9 in 1969
and from to 8.3 in 1974.
It should be noted that household assets are estimated by deducting holdings
by institutions from total outstandings. They are thus subject to errors in the
totals and in any of the estimates of other sectors' holdings.
16. The household tangible assets counted here include only owner-occupied
housing, land, and consumer durables. Tenant-occupied housing owned by in-
dividuals, and the associated land, are excluded. They presumably appear, with
a deduction for mortgage debt, in other financial assets, as equity in unincor-
porated business. If they were included in household assets, they would increase
the housing value by about one quarter in 1960. See Goldsmith and Lipsey
[1963], vol. I, Table 70.
17. The estimate of the wealth effect in Taylor [1974], Table 8, is 3.4 per-
cent.
18. Similar result
19. See, for examp
20. See also Deat(
that expected inflatjoj
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'4], Table 8, is 3.4 per-
18. Similar results for other countries are reported in Howard [1976].
19. See, for example, Silber [1970] and Kopcke [1977].
20. See also Deaton [1977]. A study by Springer [1977], however, finds
that expected inflation does increase purchases of consumer durables.
21. Goldsmith and Lipsey [1963], vol. 1, ch. 8. The leverage ratio (L) is the
ratio of the value of price.sensitive assets to net worth, price.sensitive assets
being defined as tangible assets and common stock. The percentage change in
net worth (W) is aL, where a is the change in prices of price-sensitive assets.
22. Piper [19761.
23. For a sample of sixty-five equity kicker loans negotiated during 1968—
1969, Piper and Arnold [1977] followed the price of the stock and reported
the following decline:
65 EquityKicker At the Date At Year endOn December 16,
Loans Exercised/Converted 1974 1975
24. State and local governments were forced to cut back desired long-term
borrowing by $5.2 billion from mid-1969 to mid-1970, a reduction of 28 per.
cent. Petersen [1971].
25. See Klein [1975].
26. See Friedman and Schwartz [1976].
27. See Benjamin M. Friedman [1978a] and [1978b].
28. We are ignoring here the effect of international capital movements. If
the exchange rate is expected to remain fixed (as it did for this three month
period following the initial devaluation), U.S. and foreign nominal interest
rates will tend to be equalized except for risk differentials and transactions
costs. Since foreign interest rates did not change greatly, the equalization would
have tended to keep U.S. rates from falling. But, in view of the incentive for
U.S. investors and issuers to bid domestic nominal security yields down, given
the zero inflation rate, the tendency toward international equality required a
massive outflow of short-term capital. While there was a substantial capital out-
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